The mission began in earnest on the morning of August 12, 2000. As part of the exercise, Kursk was to fire two dummy torpedoes at a Kirov-class battlecruiser. At 11:28 local time (07:28 UTC), high test peroxide (HTP), a form of highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide used as propellant for the torpedo, seeped through rust in the torpedo casing. The HTP reacted with copper and brass in the tube from which the torpedo was fired, causing a chain reaction, leading to a chemical explosion.
The watertight door separating the torpedo room from the rest of the sub was left open prior to firing. This was apparently common practice, on account of excess compressed air being released into the torpedo room when a weapon was fired. The open door allowed the blast to rip back through the first two of nine compartments on the huge sub, probably killing the seven men in the first compartment, and at least injuring or disorienting the thirty-six men in the second compartment.
After the first explosion, due to the fact the air conditioning duct was quite light, the blast wave traveled to more compartments, including the command post filling them with smoke and flames. After the explosion, the captain was believed to be trying to order an ‘emergency blow’ which causes the sub to rapidly rise to the surface, but he was quickly overcome with smoke. An emergency buoy, designed to release from a submarine automatically when emergency conditions such as rapidly changing pressure or fire are detected and intended to help rescuers locate the stricken vessel, also failed to deploy. The previous summer, in a Mediterranean mission, fears of the buoy accidentally deploying, and thereby revealing the sub’s position to the US fleet, had led to the buoy being disabled.
Two minutes and fifteen seconds after the initial eruption, a much larger explosion ripped through the sub. Seismic data from stations across Northern Europe show that the explosion occurred at the same depth as the sea bed, suggesting that the sub had collided with the sea floor which, combined with rising temperatures due to the initial explosion, had caused further torpedoes to explode. The second explosion was equivalent to 3–7 tons of TNT, or about a half-dozen torpedo warheads and measured 3.5 on the Richter scale. After the second explosion, the nuclear reactors were shut down to prevent a nuclear disaster, although the blast was almost enough to destroy the reactors.
The second explosion ripped a two-metre-square hole in the hull of the craft, which was designed to withstand depths of 1000 meters. The explosion also ripped open the third and fourth compartments. Water poured into these compartments at 90,000 litres per second – killing all those in the compartments, including five officers from 7th SSGN Division Headquarters. The fifth compartment contained the ship’s nuclear reactors, encased in a further five inches of steel. The bulkheads of the fifth compartment withstood the explosion, causing the nuclear control rods to stay in place and prevent nuclear disaster. Western experts have expressed strong admiration for the Soviet/Russian engineering skill to create a submarine that withstood so much.
Twenty-three men working in the sixth through to ninth compartments survived the two blasts. They gathered in the ninth compartment, which contained the secondary escape tunnel (the primary tunnel was in the destroyed second compartment). Captain-lieutenant Dmitri Kolesnikov (one of three officers of that rank surviving) appears to have taken charge, writing down the names of those who were in the ninth compartment. The pressure in the compartment at the time of the explosion was the same as that of the surface. Thus it would be possible from a physiological point of view to use the escape hatch to leave the submarine one man at a time, swimming up through 100 metres of Arctic water in a survival suit, to await help floating at the surface. It is not known if the escape hatch was workable from the inside – opinions still differ about how badly the hatch was damaged. However it is likely that the men rejected using the perilous escape hatch even if it were operable. They may have preferred instead to take their chances waiting for a rescue vessel to clamp itself onto the escape hatch.
It is not known with certainty how long the remaining men survived in the compartment. As the nuclear reactors had automatically shut down, emergency power soon ran out, plunging the crew into complete blackness and falling temperatures. Kolesnikov wrote two further messages, much less tidily than before. In the last, he wrote:
“It’s dark here to write, but I’ll try by feel. It seems like there are no chances, 10-20%. Let’s hope that at least someone will read this. Here’s the list of personnel from the other sections, who are now in the ninth and will attempt to get out. Regards to everybody, no need to be desperate. Kolesnikov.” |